Recent Cases: Franchise  Value  in Eminent Domain Proceedings by Editors, Law Review
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
the end of which all judgments rendered, if their total exceeds the maximum
permissible amount, would be adjusted on a pro-rata basis.
The advantages of statutory imposition of liability are: i) The issues would
be submitted to public debate prior to enactment by Congress.43 2) A passenger-
plaintiff would be vested with a legal right more advantageous to him than res
ipsa loquitur as applied under the more limited interpretations, since the risk
of non-persuasion of the jury would be shifted to the defendant. 3) Airlines,
knowing what is demanded of them, would more readily settle claims out of
court. 4) Aviation insurance underwriters, protected by the maximum liability
provision from huge potential losses which ufnrestricted application of the doc-
trine might impose upon them, would not have to seek greater premiums or
government reinsurance but might even lower their charges, thus encouraging
more air transportation by allowing airlines to reduce fares.44 5) If for any rea-
son such a law should not prove workable, it can be repealed or amended far
more easily than a well-established common-law precedent.
Although the findings of the CAB investigation in the instant case4S may not
be admitted as evidence for obvious reasons, 46 their tenor supports the court's
decision in this case. But as precedent this and similar decisions should be nar-
rowly construed and confined to the particular facts of their cases. While, in
the absence of suitable legislation, it may be necessary to invoke res ipsa loqui-
tur in some actions arising out of air disasters, the doctrine should be applied
only where all the circumstances, including available statistics on the causes of
similar previous crashes, indicate that the likelihood of the defendant's negli-
gence clearly outweighs all other possibilities.
FRANCHISE "VALUE" IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
In connection with the wartime expansion of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the
United States condemned some seventy acres of land in the borough of Brook-
lyn. For the most part, the taking by the government concerned privately
owned real estate, and the various condemnation proceedings in respect to such
property raised no noteworthy questions. Also involved, however, were munic-
ipal facilities owned by the city of New York and certain property rights of two
43 The occasional advantages of open legislation are pointed out by Miller, A Law is Passed
-The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, iS Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 799 (1948).
44 Barnes, Economic Role of Air Transportation, ii Law & Contemp. Prob. 431 (1946).
4s "The Board finds that the probable cause of this accident was the action of the pilot in
descending below the minimum enroute altitude under conditions of weather which prevented
adequate visual reference to the ground. A contributing cause was the faulty clearance given
by Airway Traffic Control, tacitly approved by the company dispatcher, and accepted by
Flight 410." CAB, op. cit. supra note 37, at 8. The summary, however, sounds much more
impressive than the facts in the report seem to justify.
46 Civil Aeronautics Act § 7or, 52 Stat. IO2 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 58I (Supp., 1947).
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public utility companies which had been engaged in supplying gas and elec-
tricity to the former residents of the taken area. The facilities taken from the
city consisted of segments of three public streets, one containing a bridge and
a crosstown trolley line, and two parcels of land under a canal and boat basin.
The taking of the land and the bridge apparently did not require any replace-
ments or adjustments by the city, but the taking of the streets made it neces-
sary to lay new connecting switches and reroute the crosstown trolley over
existing tracks with an increased operating distance of slightly more than one-
half mile. Both utilities maintained distribution facilities within the taken area.
Those of the gas company consisted of underground gas mains with small pipes
running from the mains into buildings within the area. The electric company
maintained underground conduits, cables, transformers, and service connections
to buildings supplied with electricity. In a realistic sense the taking involved
only a cutting off of both distribution systems at their points of entry into the
taken area. There they were connected to government-owned distribution
facilities of the naval base, so that in fact the United States was substituted as
consumer of the utilities' services in the area. In light of the petition of taking,
in which the government stated its intention to acquire "an estate in fee simple
absolute.., all improvements thereon and all rights, easements and appur-
tenances thereto, except removable fixtures. . . ,", both companies were given
permission to salvage or remove all their individual installations. Although the
gas company failed to do so, the electric company removed all its transformers
and some of its cables, stipulating that the removal was not a waiver of any
claim for compensation for facilities not removed. Thus the taking required no
special outlays to fulfill the franchise obligations in the new situation.
Municipal ownership and the granting of franchises are essentially similar
methods adopted by communities to provide necessary public services. Thus,
as alternatives to the Brooklyn arrangement, facilities for public transportation
are often provided by private companies while gas and electricity are furnished
through publicly owned plants. Yet this basic similarity was not recognized in
the condemnation proceedings. In dealing with the taking of city property,
both the federal district court2 and the circuit court3 in the instant case held the
condemnee entitled only to the actual cost of necessary substitute facilities.
But in the case of the utilities both courts felt compelled to proceed on the as-
sumption that the franchises were property which had in some way been taken
and for which value must be paid. They differed only as to the proper method
of valuation, the lower court issuing an order for a substantial award4 which
was reversed and remanded on the ground that evidence excluded by the dis-
trict court indicated the absence of any loss to either utility company.5
I United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 65 F. Supp. 333, 334 (N.Y., 1946).
2 United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 71 F. Supp. 255 (N.Y., 1947).
3 United States v. City of New York, 168 F. 2d 387 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
4 United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 71 F. Supp. 248 (N.Y., I947).
s United States v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F. 2d 391, 398 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
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In limiting the city's award to the cost of the switches and denying any com-
pensation for the cost of operating the longer trolley line,6 the circuit court re-
lied on evidence showing that the increased costs had been more than com-
pensated for by an increase in net revenue per mile since the date of the re-
routing. Judge Clark's opinion described the city as being "in the business not
of making profits, but of supplying public needs," and went on to emphasize the
well established rule that in such cases the measure of compensation is the
actual cost of providing the necessary substitutes. Therefore, since "there has
been no convincing evidence of any annual recurring loss, the award was prop-
erly denied."17 The "annual recurring loss" which the court found absent in the
present case-an increase in costs resulting from the taking not compensated
for by a corresponding increase in revenue-might arise in either of two fact
situations: one where the total revenue after the taking was less than the total
costs, the other where the total revenue exceeded even the increased total costs.
A logical application of the rule that public condemnees are to receive the cost
of substitute facilities would seem to call for an award in both cases, in spite of
the fact that in the latter situation the city is not actually out of pocket.
In the companion proceeding against the public utilities the district court
held that the distribution facilities which the companies had maintained within
the taken area, as well as the franchise rights to operate them, were elements
which constituted compensable property at the date of the taking. The court
refused to consider the evidence showing that the United States had subse-
quently consumed more of the condemnees' gas and electricity for use on the
naval base than had been sold to private consumers located therein prior to the
taking. On appeal Judge Clark, again speaking for the circuit court, held that
the evidence of the subsequent profits should have been considered, "not as a
standard of value in itself, but for its bearing upon the prospective value at the
time of the taking." The opinion of the lower court was reversed and the action
was remanded for further proceedings in accord with the proposition that "the
award is not to exceed the amount of the loss; and if there has been none as to
the franchise, then there should be no award for its asserted impairment." 8
It was the contention of the United States that, since the two defendant
utilities performed public services similar to those performed by the city in the
companion case, the award in both cases should be only the actual cost of pro-
viding the necessary substitute facilities elsewhere in light of the change made
by the taking. But although Judge Clark conceded that there was much logic
6 Only nominal awards of one dollar each were made for the parcels of land represented by
the streets and the land under water, the taking of which necessitated no substitute facilities.
Since the taken bridge had been built in 1936 with federal funds, the city was allowed only the
sum of $5,303, which represented the salvage realized by the United States. Also allowed was
the cost of replacing a high tension electric power line for the operation of subway and feeder
lines less the salvage value to the city of the old line.
7United States v. City of New York, x68 F. 2d 387, 391 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
8 United States v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F. 2d 391, 398 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
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in the government's contention, he insisted that while the utilities performed a
public service they were also in business for the profit of their stockholders.
"Moreover, the law seems to be too well settled for change now that the taking
of a public franchise is the taking of property for which compensation must be
paid."9 But well-settled though this rule is, the similarity between the situa-
tions of the city and the utility companies in the instant cases casts consider-
able doubt on the general validity of the distinction.
The term "franchise" has seldom received adequate definition in condemna-
tion cases. Realistically, a public utility franchise is a grant by a community
according certain privileges for use in furnishing essential public service. Re-
duced to its simplest form, a franchise merely permits the grantee to use and
occupy certain public places in order to provide the designated services. It
usually includes various terms and conditions with which the utility agrees to
comply. Underlying the granting of a franchise is the notion that the use of
these facilities is authorized by the public because essential to the public wel-
fare and convenience. Once a utility company has undertaken to provide such
service it is not free to abandon its undertaking without the consent of the
public authority. °
Historically, most franchises prescribed specific rates at which utilities'
services were to be furnished. The franchise was then the community's only
instrument of regulation"! and was at the same time a true grant of monopoly.
The monopoly position thus accorded to utilities, coupled with the typical in-
elastic demand for their services, of course accounted for the franchise rate
provisions.
For various reasons, however, the franchise proved an increasingly inade-
quate instrument for handling the problem of rates, and the result was an adop-
tion of state regulation "based on the general sovereign right to regulate in the
public interest rather than upon the contractual instrument of the franchise."x12
This function came to be performed largely by state commissions, and the sig-
nificance of franchise rate provisions disappeared. Today the franchise is prac-
tically reduced to a grant of the right to occupy public facilities in order to
distribute services which the state commission has authorized by a certificate
of public convenience and necessity.
The concept of a franchise as a contract is the basis of the surviving eminent
domain doctrine that a franchise is a sort of vested right to a certain market
for which value must be paid when it is affected by a condemnation. Insofar as
the franchise has been a regulatory device, there has never been any justifica-
9 Ibid., at 394.
10 Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537 (1930), supplemental opinion
rendered 282 U.S. 187 (1930).
- Bauer, The Public Utility Franchise, Its Functions and Terms under State Regula-
tioni (z946).
"Ibid., at 2.
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tion for this doctrine. Only the grant Of monopoly in the early franchises made
it reasonable. With this monopoly element nullified by state regulation,13 the
theory that the taking of a public franchise is the taking of property for which
compensation must be paid becomes clearly illogical, finding support only in
the opinion that it is "too well settled for change now."' 4 The court's adherence
to that theory in the Brooklyn Union Gas Company case is the more surprising
in view of an available ground for denying compensation which would have
been equally consistent with eminent domain doctrine.
The Constitution requires just compensation only for property actually
taken. Thus; the courts distinguish between the "taking" of property, which
necessitates an award, and the "damaging" of property, which does not. s Gen-
erally, a mere reduction in the value of property to its owner is not sufficient to
constitute a taking. The property itself must be appropriated to the condemn-
ing government. On the other hand, a damaging is held to imply not only that
the person responsible for the damage has received no benefit from the act but
also that the owner retains the use of his property in its now impaired condi-
tion. Since the petition of taking specifically exempted the removable fixtures,
the court might have held in the instant case that the utilities suffered nothing
but a profitable change of customers. It would have been most difficult to main-
tain that the franchises accorded a property right to deal with specific cus-
tomers. And as far as the "legal interest"' 6 of the utility companies was con-
cerned, nothing was taken but the obligation to provide their services to the
former customers, an obligation of which customers may or may not take ad-
vantage as they prefer. This rationale would have avoided the issue of franchise
value, at the same time furnishing a more satisfactory basis for the denial of
compensation than the theory employed by the court.
Once the court had accepted the premise that a franchise is compensable
property, it was faced with the problem of finding the "value" of "taken prop-
erty" which was in fact earning the utilities more than it had before the taking.
The franchise was valued by the court not as a disembodied property right in-
herently valuable in itself but rather as a commercial entity to be appraised by
judgment of the "capacity of the franchise to produce earnings." Application
13 Such monopoly advantages as public utilities now enjoy stem not from their franchises
but from the operation of the doctrine of public convenience and necessity in the granting of
certificates by state commissions and from partial ineffectiveness of rate regulation by these
commissions.
14 United States v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., i68 F. 2d 391, 394 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
is "There is a marked distinction between the instances where the State appropriates...
business... intending to continue its operation as a public service enterprise ... and those
instances where the State desires the property and not the business." Banner Milling Co. v.
State, 240 N.Y. 533, 539, 148 N.E. 668, 670 (1925); see Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S.
341 (1925); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
,6 "This is not an award for business losses... but is a means of finding present worth in
a legal interest.... ." United States v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F. 2d 391, 395 (C.C.A.
2d, 1948).
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of this standard was to be made by an "exercise of business judgment to deter-
mine whether there has been an impairment of productiveness, and if so, by
how much."' 7 Given the assumption that property had been taken, this was a
sound method of valuation. Because no "market price" is available by which to
evaluate the franchise as a disembodied right, the "worth [of the franchise] as
a producer of earnings" is admissible as evidence of value. As a partial limita-
tion on this type of valuation, the court implied that business judgment is to be
applied rather conservatively on the ground that it involves too many uncer-
tain premises. 8
But the real flaw in valuing a franchise upon its capacity to produce earnings
lies in the fact that a taking which causes a "reduction of earning capacity"
within the area taken compels an award for the value of the franchise. Suppose
an area in which a substantial amount of electricity had been supplied to rural
homes were taken by the government for use as an artillery range. Under the
circuit court's reasoning such a loss of earning power could not logically be ex-
cluded as evidence of the value of the taken franchise, even though the present-
day function of a utility franchise makes the granting of such an award clearly
objectionable. Under the facts of the present case, the court's approach pro-
duced a sound result-denial of compensation. Where a loss is established,
however, equally sound results can be achieved only by eliminating the premise
that a franchise is valuable property. Direct attack on this premise in the pres-
ent case would have prevented future difficulty in distinguishing the Brooklyn
Union Gas Company reasoning to prevent awards to franchise holders who had
suffered business losses because of a taking.
17 The court was thus rejecting the stand taken by the Supreme Court in Long Island Water
Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 69o (1897), that such contract right "is a mere incident
to the tangible property.... Its impairment... is a mere consequence of the appropriation
of the tangible property."
18 The court suggested gross receipts, the actual volume of sales past and present, while
forecasts of future net earnings based on variables unrelated to the taking were rejected.
